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This study aims to determine the effect of corporate diversification, 
institutional ownership, and the change of chief executive officer (CEO) to 
earnings management. The population in this study is the consumer goods 
industry sector companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. Sampling 
used in this study is the census of the entire population being the study sample, 
and the number of samples of this study was 35 companies. The research data 
is secondary data obtained from the Indonesia Stock Exchange website from 
2013 to 2018. The research hypothesis testing uses multiple linear regression 
analysis techniques, with SPSS application tools. The results showed that: (1) 
Corporate diversification has a positive effect on earnings management. (2) 
Institutional ownership has a positive and significant effect on earnings 
management. (3) CEO replacement has a negative and significant effect on 
earnings management. (4) corporate diversification, CEO replacement, and 
institutional leadership simultaneously have a significant effect on earnings 
management. 
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1   Introduction 
 
Financial statements are the main tool for managers to show the results of performance and achievements carried out 
in carrying out the company's operational activities. Financial statements relating to the provision and delivery of 
information. In general, the income statement takes more attention from the users of the financial statements compared 
to other reports, because the income statement can help the owner or other parties in estimating the company's earning 
power in the future. The tendency of external parties to pay more attention to earnings information in measuring 
company performance will encourage management to manipulate earnings information. This is what then led to the 
emergence of earnings management. 
Earnings management is an activity of manipulating financial statements by choosing appropriate accounting 
methods and is appropriate to achieve the expected level of profit (Belkaoui & Riahi, 2006). Earnings management is 
deliberately carried out by management to trick stakeholders who want to know the performance and condition of the 
company. Earnings management also causes the resulting financial statements to be biased and reduce the credibility 
of financial statements because the reported numbers do not reflect the actual conditions (Healy & Wahlen, 1999). 
Seeing the development of the economy in Indonesia, where an increasing number of companies are expanding, one 
of them is by diversifying. Earnings management is often carried out by diversified companies. Earnings information 
is one of the benchmarks used to assess company performance by users of financial statements. The main concern for 
estimating management performance or responsibility is focused on the earnings information presented. Profit is a 
measure often used to assess an entity for a period (Chen & Ho, 2000; Singh et al., 2003; Lichtenthaler, 2005). 
Earnings information helps stakeholders in making decisions and predict the company's earnings power in the 
future. Masud et al. (2017) states that locally diversified companies and a combination of industry and geographically 
diversified companies mitigate earnings management, and this research is in line with Vasilescu & Millo (2016), 
Alhadab (2015), Haroon et al. (2015) research. Ajay & Madhumati (2015), Nugroho &Darsono (2015), Rodríguez-
Pérez & Van Hemmen (2010), Lim et al. (2008), which states that corporate diversification has a positive effect on 
earnings management. According to Jensen & Meckling (1976) states that institutional ownership can reduce conflicts 
of interest between management and company owners. Institutional ownership does not easily believe in earnings 
management behavior carried out by management. Institutional ownership is ownership of company shares by 
insurance companies, banks, and investment companies. Research conducted at companies in Taiwan shows that 
institutional investor ownership plays an important role in shaping real earnings management (Lan et al., 2015). 
The results of Riwayati (2016) existence of an independent commissioner have the effect of reducing asymmetric 
information to earnings management actions, whereby companies that carry out accrual practices or aggressive 
earnings management tend to implement corporate governance using institutional decisions. This is in line with 
research by Bukit & Nasution (2015), Iraya et al. (2015), Man & Wong (2013), Waweru & Riro (2013), Liu (2007), 
and  Cornett (2001), who stated that institutional ownership has a positive effect on earning management. Following 
the theory put forward by Scott (1997) which states at the time of CEO replacement will lead to earnings management 
practices with taking a bath pattern. Companies that make CEO replacements, tend to take action taking a bath to get 
the maximum profit in the desired period. Taking a bath is an earning management activity by shifting the estimated 
cost of the coming period to the present so that the performance of the new CEO can be considered successful and the 
new CEO has a greater chance of earning profits in the future (Wandeca & Liza Alvia, 2012). 
Hazarika (2012), proves there are earnings management actions taken by the new CEO. Earnings management in 
this research was found in the form of income decreasing by the new CEO to maximize high profit in the next period. 
The implications of these studies show that earnings management practices always overshadow CEO replacement 
events wherever the company operates. This is in line with the research of Yasa & Novialy (2012), Sadia (2014), and 
Martin (2011), which states that CEO replacement has a negative effect on earnings management. 
 
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
 
Diversified companies have a more complex organizational structure, less transparency so that investors have difficulty 
in analyzing the company. Diversification not only motivates managers to carry out accounting manipulations but also 
makes conditions supportive of making earnings management difficult to detect. This study is in line with research by 
Masud et al. (2017), Vasilescu & Millo (2016), Alhadab (2015), Haroon et al. (2015), Ajay & Ajay & Madhumati 
(2015), Nugroho &Darsono (2015), Rodríguez-Pérez & Van Hemmen (2010), Lim et al. (2008) which states that 
corporate diversification has a positive effect on earnings management. 
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H1: corporate diversification has a positive effect on earnings management 
 
Institutional ownership can reduce conflicts of interest between management and company owners. Institutional 
ownership does not easily believe in earnings management behavior carried out by management. Institutional 
ownership is ownership of company shares by insurance companies, banks, and investment companies. Research 
conducted on companies in Taiwan shows that institutional investor ownership plays an important role in shaping 
earnings management (Lan et al., 2015; Martin & Sayrak, 2003; Comment & Jarrell, 1995). Another result obtained 
from research conducted in Nigeria which shows the result that there is a positive relationship between institutional 
investor ownership and earnings management (Isenmila & Elijah, 2012). This is in line with research by Riwayati 
(2016), Bukit & Nasution (2015), Iraya et al. (2015), Man  & Wong (2013), Waweru & Riro (2013), Liu (2007), and  
Cornett (2001), who stated that institutional ownership has a positive effect on earnings management. 
 
H2: institutional ownership has a positive effect on earnings management 
 
The new CEO replacement encourages management to practice earnings management in the form of taking a bath. 
According to Handoko (2006) the company's financial statements reduce income to make a loss the following year in 
increasing future profits. Scott (1997), states that the new CEO has the potential to take a bath in order to maximize 
high profit in the next period. The reason for the new CEO is taking a bath because he does not want to be responsible 
for the poor performance of the previous CEO. Hazarika (2012), proves there are earnings management actions taken 
by the new CEO. Earnings management in this research was found in the form of income decreasing by the new CEO 
in order to maximize high profit in the next period. The implications of these studies show that earnings management 
practices always overshadow CEO replacement events wherever the company operates. This is in line with research 
by Yasa & Novialy (2012), Sadia (2014), and Martin (2011), which states that CEO replacement has a negative effect 
on earnings management. 
 
H3: CEO replacement has a negative effect on earnings management 
 
 
2   Methods 
 
This research was conducted using an associative approach. Associative research is research that aims to explain the 
effect or also the relationship between two or more variables. The method of collection in this study uses the non-
participant observation method, namely the selection of sample companies in the consumer goods industry sector listed 
on the Indonesia Stock Exchange during the study period based on certain criteria. The purpose of this method is to 
get samples that are in accordance with predetermined criteria. The criteria used to determine earnings management 
companies whose companies have diversified the company, institutional ownership, and CEO replacement for at least 
two consecutive years, namely in 2013 to 2018. 
 
 
3   Results and Discussions 
 
This study connects the effect of corporate diversification, institutional ownership, CEO replacement on earnings 
management. This study was conducted on companies in the consumer goods industry sector which are listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange. The analysis technique used is linear regression analysis, to predict the relationship between 
independent variables, the dependent variable. 
 
3.1   Multiple Linear Regression Analysis 
 
Multiple linear regression analysis is a linear relationship between two or more independent variables (X1, X2, X3, 
and X4) with the dependent variable (Y). The data used is usually interval or ratio scale. 
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Table 1 
Multiple Linear Regression Analysis 
 
Coefficients a  
 Model  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
  1 
 (Constant)  40.11 17.33   2.31 0.02 
corporate diversification -12.28 23.56 -0.04 -0.52 0.60 
institutional ownership -0.43 0.19 -0.16 -2.32 0.02 
 CEO Replacement  -3.60 18.67 -0.01 -0.19 0.85 
 R  0.17 
 R Square  0.28 
 Adjusted R Square  0.14 
 F value 1.99 
 Sig.  0.12 
Secondary data, 2019 
 
Based on the results of the regression analysis as presented in Table 1, the structural equation can be made as follows: 
 
Y = 40.11 – (12.28) X1 + (0.43) X2  + (3.60) X3 
 
3.2   Effect of Corporate Diversification on Earnings Management 
 
Based on Table 1 results of the company's diversification t-test, the earnings management obtained a significance value 
of 0.00 with a beta coefficient value of 1.03 positive value. A significance value of 0.00 <0.05 indicates that H1 was 
accepted. This result means that the company's diversification has a positive and significant effect on earnings 
management. This result means that Corporate Diversification has a positive and significant effect on earnings 
management. In other words, the increasing diversification of the company will further improve earnings management, 
on the contrary, if the diversification of the company decreases the earnings management will decrease. 
Earnings management is often carried out by diversified companies. The phenomenon of the relationship between 
Corporate Diversification and earnings management is increasingly in the spotlight. Diversified companies are on 
average more likely to do earnings management than companies of similar size that are focused on one area of their 
business. This can happen because the higher the level of diversification of a company, the level of transparency will 
tend to decrease. Account translation and consolidation are some of the factors that can reduce a company's 
transparency to external parties, and it is this decrease in transparency that results in increasing the implementation of 
earnings management in a company. The implementation of diversification will cause the organizational structure 
contained in the company to become more complex and lower levels of transparency and complexity of information 
for investors and financial analysis will be higher. The existence of information asymmetry between management and 
company owners can lead to earnings management practices and the higher the level of information asymmetry, the 
less information owned by owners and financial analysts to see the possibility of profit manipulation. 
Corporate diversification has a more complex organizational structure, less transparency so that investors have 
difficulty in analyzing the company. Diversification not only motivates managers to carry out accounting 
manipulations but also makes conditions supportive of making earnings management difficult to detect. This study is 
in line with research by Masud et al. (2017), Vasilescu & Millo (2016), Alhadab (2015), Haroon et al. (2015), Ajay & 
Madhumati (2015), Nugroho &Darsono (2015), Rodríguez-Pérez & Van Hemmen (2010), Lim et al., (2008) which 
states that Corporate Diversification has a positive effect on earnings management. 
 
3.3   Effects of Institutional Ownership on Earnings Management 
 
Based on Table 1, the results of the t-test for institutional ownership on earnings management obtained a significance 
value of 0.00 with a beta coefficient of 0.07 positive. A significance value of 0.00 <0.05 indicates that H2 was received. 
This result means that institutional ownership has a positive and significant effect on earnings management. This result 
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means that institutional ownership has a positive and significant effect on earnings management. In other words, 
increasing institutional ownership will increasingly improve earnings management, conversely, if institutional 
ownership decreases, earnings management will decrease. 
Institutional ownership can reduce conflicts of interest between management and company owners. Institutional 
ownership does not easily believe in earnings management behavior carried out by management. Institutional 
ownership is ownership of company shares by insurance companies, banks, and investment companies. Research 
conducted on companies in Taiwan shows that institutional investor ownership plays an important role in shaping 
earnings management (Lan et al., 2015). Another result obtained from research conducted in Nigeria which shows the 
result that there is a positive relationship between institutional investor ownership and earnings management (Isenmila 
& Elijah, 2012). This is in line with research by Riwayati (2016), Bukit & Nasution (2015), Iraya et al. (2015), Man 
& Wong (2013), Waweru & Riro (2013), Liu (2007), and  Cornett (2001), who stated that institutional ownership has 
a positive effect on earnings management. 
 
3.4   Effect of CEO Replacement on Earning Management 
 
Based on Table 1 the results of the CEO replacement test on earnings management obtained a significance value of 
0.00 with a coefficient value of beta -0.49 negative value. A significance value of 0.00 <0.05 indicates that H3 is 
accepted. This result means that CEO replacement has a negative and significant effect on earnings management. This 
result means that CEO replacement has a negative and significant effect on earnings management. In other words, the 
increasing CEO replacement will further reduce earnings management, conversely, if CEO replacement decreases the 
earnings management will increase. 
Substitution of chief executive officer, hereinafter referred to as CEO, can motivate earnings management to be 
carried out, this condition is caused by the CEO as a trusted agent in the preparation of strategies and corporate decision 
making to achieve certain objectives within the company. Yasa & Novialy (2012) state that CEOs have an increased 
risk of job loss. The risk arises if the results obtained or company profits in one period are not following the objectives 
of the principal and the CEO must be responsible for the results obtained. This situation will encourage the principal 
to replace the company's CEO because he thinks the current CEO has failed to carry out his duties, while on the CEO's 
situation this will force him to manage earnings so that his position is not replaced in the company. Before the CEO 
replacement is done earning management actions carried out by the old CEO tend to aim to get a bonus before he was 
fired by increasing profits (income increasing). Income increasing is done by the CEO at the time before the turnover 
with the motivation to get a large bonus before being replaced. 
The new CEO replacement encourages management to practice earnings management in the form of taking a bath. 
According to Handoko (2006) the company's financial statements reduce income to make a loss the following year in 
increasing future profits. Scott (1997), states that the new CEO has the potential to take a bath to maximize high profit 
in the next period. The reason the new CEO took a bath was that he did not want to be responsible for the poor 
performance of the previous CEO. Hazarika (2012), proves there are earnings management actions taken by the new 
CEO. Earnings management in this research was found in the form of income decreasing by the new CEO to maximize 
high profit in the next period. The implications of these studies show that earnings management practices always 
overshadow CEO replacement events wherever the company operates. This is in line with research by Yasa & Novialy 
(2012), Sadia (2014), and Martin (2011), which states that CEO replacement has a negative effect on earnings 
management. 
 
3.5   Effect of Corporate Diversification, CEO replacement, and Institutional Ownership on Earnings Management 
 
Based on Table 1 the results of the simultaneous significance test (F-Test) obtained a significance value of F of 0.00. 
The significance value of 0.00 <0.05 indicates that Corporate Diversification, CEO replacement, and institutional 
leadership simultaneously have a significant effect on earnings management. These results mean that Corporate 
Diversification, institutional leadership, and CEO replacement simultaneously have a significant effect on earnings 
management. In other words, corporate diversification, institutional leadership, and CEO replacement simultaneously 
have a significant effect on earnings management, affecting the decline and increase of management together. 
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3.6   Analysis of the Coefficient of Determination 
 
The magnitude of the influence of independent variables on the dependent variable shown by the total determination 
value (R Square Adjusted) of 0.20 means that 20% of earnings management variation is influenced by variations 
incorporates diversification, institutional leadership, and CEO replacement while the remaining 80% is explained by 
factors others are not included in the model. 
 
 
4   Conclusion 
 
Corporate diversification has a positive and significant effect on earnings management. In other words, the increasing 
diversification of the company will further improve earnings management, on the contrary, if the diversification of the 
company decreases the earnings management will decrease. Institutional ownership has a positive and significant effect 
on earnings management. In other words, increasing institutional ownership will increasingly improve earnings 
management, conversely, if institutional ownership decreases, earnings management will decrease. CEO replacement 
has a negative and significant effect on earnings management. In other words, the increasing CEO replacement will 
further reduce earnings management, conversely, if CEO replacement decreases the earnings management will 
increase. Based on the analysis results obtained by corporate diversification, institutional leadership, and CEO 
replacement simultaneously have a significant effect on earnings management. In other words, corporate 
diversification, institutional leadership, and CEO replacement simultaneously have a significant effect on earnings 
management, affecting the decline and increase of management together. 
 
Conflict of interest statement 
The authors declared that they have no competing interests. 
 
Statement of authorship 
The authors have a responsibility for the conception and design of the study. The authors have approved the final 
article. 
 
Acknowledgments 
We are grateful to two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments on the earlier version of this paper. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         ISSN: 2395-7492 
IRJMIS   Vol. 7 No. 5, September 2020, pages: 24-xx 
30
References 
Ajay, R., & Madhumathi, R. (2015). Diversification Strategy and Earnings Management: An Empirical Investigation 
of Firms in Manufacturing Sector. In 2015 Financial Markets & Corporate Governance Conference. 
https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2557552 
Ajay, R., & Madhumathi, R. (2015). Do corporate diversification and earnings management practices affect capital 
structure?. Journal of Indian Business Research. https://doi.org/10.1108/JIBR-01-2015-0008 
Ajay, R., & Madhumathi, R. (2015). Institutional ownership and earnings management in India. Indian Journal of 
Corporate Governance, 8(2), 119-136. https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0974686215602368 
Alhadab, M. M. (2015). Do Nonaudit Service Fees Associate With Accrual Earnings Management During The 
Ipo?. Corporate Ownership & Control, 441. 
Belkaoui, A. R. (2006). Accounting Theory (Buku 1). Edisi Kelima. Jakarta: Salemba Empat. 
Bukit, R. B., & Nasution, F. N. (2015). Employee diff, free cash flow, corporate governance and earnings 
management. Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences, 211, 585-594. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sbspro.2015.11.077  
Cardosa, F. T., Martinez, A. L., dan Teixeira. 2014. Free Cash Flow and Earning Management in Brazil: The Negative 
Side of Financial Slack. Global Journal of Management and Business Research. 14(1). pp : 85 – 95. 
Chen, S. S., & Ho, K. W. (2000). Corporate diversification, ownership structure, and firm value: The Singapore 
evidence. International Review of Financial Analysis, 9(3), 315-326. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1057-
5219(00)00032-6 
Comment, R., & Jarrell, G. A. (1995). Corporate focus and stock returns. Journal of financial Economics, 37(1), 67-
87. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(94)00777-X 
Cornett, M. M., McNutt, J. J., & Tehranian, H. (2009). Corporate governance and earnings management at large US 
bank holding companies. Journal of Corporate finance, 15(4), 412-430. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2009.04.003 
Handoko, R. S. (2006). Analisis Pengaruh Kredibilitas Endorser dan Kreatifitas Iklan Terhadap Efektivitas Iklan yang 
Mempengaruhi Sikap Terhadap Merek (Studi Kasus Iklan Televisi Pada Konsumen Sepeda Motor Honda Di Kota 
Semarang) (Doctoral dissertation, Program Pasca Sarjana Universitas Diponegoro). 
Haroon, M., Gallagher, P., & FitzGerald, O. (2015). Diagnostic delay of more than 6 months contributes to poor 
radiographic and functional outcome in psoriatic arthritis. Annals of the rheumatic diseases, 74(6), 1045-1050. 
Hazarika, S., Karpoff, J. M., & Nahata, R. (2012). Internal corporate governance, CEO turnover, and earnings 
management. Journal of Financial Economics, 104(1), 44-69. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.10.011 
Healy, P. M., & Wahlen, J. M. (1999). A review of the earnings management literature and its implications for standard 
setting. Accounting horizons, 13(4), 365-383. https://doi.org/10.2308/acch.1999.13.4.365 
Iraya, C., Mwangi, M., & Wanjohi, G. (2014). The effect of corporate governance practices on earnings management 
of companies listed at the Nairobi securities exchange. 
Isenmila & Elijah, A. (2012). Earning management and ownership structure: Evidence from Nigeria. Research Journal 
of Finance and Accounting, 3(7). 
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership 
structure. Journal of financial economics, 3(4), 305-360. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X 
Lichtenthaler, E. (2005). Corporate diversification: identifying new businesses systematically in the diversified 
firm. Technovation, 25(7), 697-709. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.technovation.2003.12.005 
Lim, C. Y., Thong, T. Y., & Ding, D. K. (2008). Firm diversification and earnings management: evidence from 
seasoned equity offerings. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 30(1), 69-92. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-007-0043-x 
Liu, B. (2007). Uncertainty theory. In Uncertainty theory (pp. 205-234). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73165-8_5 
Liu, J. L., & Tsai, C. C. (2015). Board member characteristics and ownership structure impacts on real earnings 
management: Evidence from Taiwan. Accounting and Finance Research, 4(4), 84-96. 
Man, C. K., & Wong, B. (2013). Corporate governance and earnings management: A survey of literature. Journal of 
Applied Business Research, 29(2), 391-418. 
Martin, J. D., & Sayrak, A. (2003). Corporate diversification and shareholder value: a survey of recent 
literature. Journal of corporate finance, 9(1), 37-57. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0929-1199(01)00053-0 
Martin, R. (2011). The CEO's ethical dilemma in the era of earnings management. Strategy & Leadership. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/10878571111176628 
IRJMIS                  ISSN: 2395-7492     
 
Handayani, N. P. P. D., & Wiksuana, I. G. B. (2020). Corporate diversification, institutional ownership, and chief 
executive officer replacement to earning management. International Research Journal of Management, IT and Social 
Sciences, 7(5), 24-31. https://doi.org/10.21744/irjmis.v7n5.963 
31 
Masud, M. H., Anees, F., & Ahmed, H. (2017). Impact of corporate diversification on earnings management. Journal 
of Indian Business Research. https://doi.org/10.1108/JIBR-06-2015-0070 
Nugroho, S., & Darsono, D. (2015). Pengaruh Kompensasi, Kepemilikan Manajerial, Diversifikasi Perusahaan Dan 
Ukuran Kap Terhadap Manajemen Laba (studi empiris pada perusahaan manufaktur yang terdaftar di Bursa 
Efek Indonesia tahun 2011-2013) (Doctoral dissertation, Fakultas Ekonomika dan Bisnis). 
Riwayatiak, H. E., & MarNonahb, M. S. (2016). Implementation of corporate governance influence to earnings 
management. Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences, 219, 632-638. 
Rodríguez-Pérez, G., & Van Hemmen, S. (2010). Debt, diversification and earnings management. Journal of 
accounting and public policy, 29(2), 138-159. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2009.10.005 
Sadia, N. P. M. D., & Sukartha, I. M. (2014). Pengaruh pergantian CEO pada praktik manajemen laba perusahaan 
publik yang terdaftar di bursa efek indonesia. E-Jurnal Akuntansi Universitas Udayana, 8(2014), 200-210. 
Scott, W. R. (1997). Financial accounting theory (Vol. 343). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Singh, M., Davidson III, W. N., & Suchard, J. A. (2003). Corporate diversification strategies and capital structure. The 
Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 43(1), 147-167. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1062-9769(02)00124-2 
Vasilescu, C., & Millo, Y. (2016). Do industrial and geographic diversifications have different effects on earnings 
management? Evidence from UK mergers and acquisitions. International Review of Financial Analysis, 46, 33-45. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2016.04.009 
Wandeca, J. S., & Liza Alvia, S. E. (2012). Analisis Pengaruh Pergantian Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Terhadap 
Praktek Manajemen Laba (Studi Pada Perusahaan BUMN dan Non BUMN di Bursa Efek Indonesia). Jurnal 
Universitas Lampung. 
Waweru, N. M., & Riro, G. K. (2013). Corporate governance, firm characteristics and earnings management in an 
emerging economy. Journal of Applied Management Accounting Research, 11(1), 43. 
Yasa, G. W., & Novialy, Y. (2012). Indikasi Manajemen Laba oleh CEO Baru pada Perusahaan yang Terdaftar di 
Pasar Modal Indonesia. E-Jurnal Akuntansi Universitas Udayana. 
 
 
 
 
